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ABSTRACT: Four case studies document the progress achieved in the past five years by 
health care organizations that were early leaders in patient safety improvement. Their expe-
rience reflects an expansion of interventions from individual hospital units to whole facili-
ties and delivery systems, including new settings such as home health care. Approaches 
include developing practical methods for training, coaching, and motivating staff to 
engage in patient safety work; designing effective tools and systems to minimize error and 
maximize learning; and leading change by setting ambitious goals, measuring and holding 
units accountable for performance, and sharing stories to convey values. Results include 
advancements in safety practices, reductions in serious events of patient harm, improved 
organizational safety climate and morale, and declines in malpractice claims. Keeping the 
commitment to patient safety has required sustained focus on making safety a core orga-
nizational value, a willingness to innovate and adapt, and perseverance in pursuing goals.
    
INTRODUCTION
In the decade since the Institute of Medicine (IOM) issued its landmark 1999 
report To Err Is Human, there have been a number of successful efforts to 
improve patient safety in the United States.1 Notable among these are national, 
statewide, and professional campaigns to persuade hospitals to adopt practices 
that have been shown to reduce patient mortality by preventing health care–asso-
ciated infections and complications of surgical care.2 Nevertheless, the nation 
appears to be far from realizing the goal of eliminating unintentional harm to 
some patients resulting from health care. For example, a recent study found no 
significant change from 2002 to 2007 in the overall rate of patient harm or of 
preventable harm recorded in patient records drawn from a random sample of 10 
hospitals in North Carolina.3
In his recent assessment of the nation’s progress in making health care 
safer, Robert M. Wachter, M.D.—an academic physician executive and recog-
nized expert on patient safety—gave the United States an overall grade of B–, 
reflecting “modest improvement” during the years 2004 to 2009, compared with 
an earlier grade of C+ for the 1999–2004 period following the IOM report.4 He 
noted that “hard evidence of improved outcomes remains elusive because of our 
rudimentary measurement capacity in safety.” To help fill gaps in knowledge, 
case studies can provide useful insights into exemplary efforts and learning from 
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the field about what is working in particular contexts 
over a given period.
A series of Commonwealth Fund case studies 
conducted on the fifth anniversary of the IOM report 
identified several health care organizations that had 
taken promising steps toward realizing one of the 
IOM’s key recommendations: creating an organiza-
tional culture of safety.5,6 This follow-up report sum-
marizes longitudinal findings from site visits to four of 
those organizations in order to document their progress 
in patient safety during the past five years. These four 
sites were selected to represent how early leaders in 
patient safety—identified by experts and a review of 
the literature five years ago—have continued to build 
on their initial work so as to sustain or intensify its 
effectiveness and expand its application throughout the 
organization.7 Hence, the cases are meant to illustrate 
the kinds of improvements that can be achieved with 
sustained effort. Their findings may be of interest to 
policymakers and other hospitals and health systems 
that are seeking to enhance their efforts to improve 
patient safety.
The report is organized as follows: It begins 
by summarizing findings from the case studies, then 
presents the combined results from the study sites’ 
self-assessment of their progress in improving patient 
safety, and finally discusses cross-site themes and 
insights.
OVERVIEW OF THE CASE STUDIES
The four case-study sites are all multicampus, inte-
grated health care delivery systems: Johns Hopkins 
Medicine (Johns Hopkins) in Maryland; OSF 
HealthCare, operated by the Sisters of the Third 
Order of St. Francis, in Illinois and Michigan; Sentara 
Healthcare in Virginia and North Carolina; and the 
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), which oper-
ates facilities nationwide. Exhibit 1 on pages 4 and 
5 summarizes information from the four case studies 
including their organizational settings, the strategies 
and interventions they have undertaken, and selected 
results they have achieved. 
Consistent with our previous report, the study 
sites’ patient safety improvement strategies and inter-
ventions have three instrumental areas of focus: 
1. People: developing practical methods for train-
ing, coaching, and motivating staff to engage in 
patient safety work, to practice teamwork and 
other safety-related behaviors, and to develop a 
mindfulness for recognizing safety threats and 
acting to mitigate them; 
2. Processes: designing and deploying effective 
information systems, standardized clinical pro-
cesses, analytic methods, and other tools (such 
as checklists) to facilitate clear communication, 
minimize opportunities for errors to occur, and 
learn from mistakes so that they will not recur; 
and 
3. Organization: making safety a core value and 
priority, setting ambitious goals, measuring and 
giving feedback on performance, collecting and 
sharing success stories, and recognizing and 
holding units accountable for meeting targets.
Study sites have expanded their early efforts, 
from pilot programs in individual units or facilities to 
hospitalwide and systemwide initiatives. Sites such 
as the VA that had previously engaged in systemwide 
interventions to promote safety-event reporting and 
analysis, expanded the scope and rigor of the interven-
tions to build more effective teamwork and commu-
nication skills, often starting with pilot programs to 
learn what works before implementing more expansive 
change. Sites that rely on community physicians to 
staff their hospitals have been reaching out to identify 
physician “champions” who can act as role models to 
mentor peers within their system. Leaders also found 
that safety principles could be adapted to new care  
settings, such as home health care services, and that 
tools could be used to facilitate patients’ engagement  
in their care.
Results generally reflect this broadened and 
intensified scope of work. Whereas outcomes in the 
prior period could be described as promising, in the 
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past five years sites have achieved and sustained more 
impressive gains at the facility and/or system level, 
including:
•	 increased compliance with safety practices such 
as hand hygiene, timely and effective analyses 
of safety events, and use of standardized pro-
cesses and checklists;
•	 substantial and sustained reductions in serious 
safety events such as patient falls, health care–
associated infections, and hospital-acquired 
pressure ulcers;
•	 reductions in patient mortality associated with 
specific interventions, such as checklist-guided 
surgical briefings or evidence-based infection-
prevention activities; 
•	 improved staff perceptions of organizational 
or team-level safety climate and morale, which 
were associated with reduced nurse turnover in 
some units; and
•	 declines in malpractice suits and claims.
It should be noted that these sites were selected 
to illustrate how local delivery systems have been 
instrumental in organization-wide patient safety 
improvement over time. In some cases, results of 
their efforts have exceeded national improvement and 
achieved better-than-average performance on specific 
measures of patient safety for which comparative data 
are available, such as rates of health care–associated 
infections in intensive care units (Appendix A).8 The 
study sites also have improved critical safety practices 
and outcomes (such as patient falls) that are not yet 
being systematically tracked at a national level. 
During the past five years, other hospitals and 
health systems have adopted some of the strategies 
employed by the study sites to achieve high levels of 
performance in specific domains such as infection pre-
vention. Johns Hopkins’ Comprehensive Unit-Based 
Safety Program, for example, has been used as part of 
a collaborative improvement intervention to advance 
safety culture and reduce health care–associated infec-
tions in the intensive care units (ICUs) of hospitals 
in Michigan and several other states.9 (Similar kinds 
of targeted interventions are described in companion 
case-study reports published by the Commonwealth 
Fund.10) Findings from the four case studies also are 
generally consistent with other reports in the literature 
describing successful organization-wide initiatives to 
improve patient safety.11
Identifying organizations that are leaders in 
reducing preventable harm to patients is a challenge, 
because the nation lacks an agreed-upon comprehen-
sive measure of patient safety that could be used for 
benchmarking performance. The creation of such a 
measure may become feasible in the future once a 
critical mass of the nation’s health care providers have 
adopted electronic health records (EHRs) that use 
standard definitions to report on the quality and safety 
of care. In the meantime, by leveraging their invest-
ment in information systems to track performance at 
the unit, department, and/or facility level, study sites 
have innovated in developing measures of patient harm 
and risk-adjusted outcomes that spur ongoing improve-
ments in care.12,13 
Individual case studies described in this report are available for download from the Fund Web site at 
 www.commonwealthfund.org.
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Exhibit 1. Overview of Case Study Site Settings, Strategies, and Results
Setting Strategies/Interventions Selected Results
Johns Hopkins Medicine14 (Maryland)
Johns Hopkins Hospital, a 945-bed 
academic medical center, and the Johns 
Hopkins Home Care Group, which provides 
services to 10,000 patients statewide. Both 
are components of Johns Hopkins Health 
System, a five-hospital nonprofit integrated 
health care delivery system affiliated with 
the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine in 
Baltimore, Maryland. 
1. Encouraging leadership to set goals and 
reinforce patient safety as an organizational 
priority.
2. Teaching the science of safety to enable 
staff to recognize and address threats to 
patient safety.
3. Linking patient safety efforts to the 
institution’s core values of research and 
discovery.
4. Spreading the Comprehensive Unit-
Based Safety Program to build capacity for 
improvement among frontline teams.
5. Enhancing transparency of safety 
performance measures.
Similar strategies were adapted for use in 
the Home Care Group.
● 75–100 percent reduction over nine 
years in rates of central line–associated 
bloodstream infections in surgical ICUs.
● Reduction of more than 20 percent over 
three years in rates of patient falls and 
injuries from falls.
● 56 percent reduction over three years in 
rate of at-risk patients with hospital-acquired 
pressure ulcers.
● Near doubling in observed rate of hand 
hygiene compliance by clinicians both before 
and after seeing a patient.
● Improved staff perceptions of safety 
climate and teamwork hospitalwide; lower 
nursing turnover in some units.
● Reduction in annual hospitalization rate 
among home care patients to below the 
national average (23% vs. 29%).
Sentara Healthcare15 (Virginia and North Carolina)
A nonprofit integrated health care delivery 
system that operates more than 100 sites of 
care in Virginia and North Carolina including 
eight hospitals, seven nursing homes, eight 
outpatient and diagnostic-imaging centers, 
a medical group with 120 physician offices, 
a home health care division, a health plan, a 
school of health professions, and a medical 
residency program.
1. Elevating patient safety to a core 
organizational value.
2. Encouraging employees to adopt safety 
habits for error prevention.
3. Simplifying work processes to prevent 
error.
4. Implementing rigorous root-cause and 
common-cause analysis methods to make 
systemic changes.
5. Spreading and sustaining change by: 
(a) helping staff develop mindfulness to 
recognize signals of inadequate care; (b) 
providing methods for leaders to reinforce 
safety habits; (c) engaging physicians in 
safety work; (d) instituting processes for 
learning from mistakes; and (e) setting high 
standards and rewarding their attainment.
● 80 percent reduction over seven years in 
the serious safety event rate across Sentara 
hospitals. 
● 42 percent decline over six years in the 
rate of patient falls with injuries.
● Reductions over seven years of 93 
percent in average rates of ventilator-
associated pneumonia and of 89 percent in 
rates of central line–associated bloodstream 
infections in Sentara’s ICUs.
● 23 percent decline over five years in risk-
adjusted in-hospital mortality across seven 
Sentara hospitals, to a rate 50 percent better 
than expected.
● 40 percent increase over two years in 
reported knowledge and practice of safety 
habits by staff in Sentara hospitals.
● 43 percent decline over six years in 
the annual rolling-average number of 
malpractice suits and claims.
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Setting Strategies/Interventions Selected Results
OSF HealthCare16 (Illinois and Michigan)
A nonprofit integrated health care delivery 
system with seven hospitals in Illinois and 
Michigan (ranging from a 25-bed critical-
access hospital to a 616-bed teaching 
facility), a medical group, a long-term care 
facility, home care services, and two colleges 
of nursing. The network is owned and 
operated by the Sisters of the Third Order of 
Saint Francis, based in Peoria, Illinois.
1. Enhancing organizational learning, in part 
by encouraging staff to report safety risks to 
a systemwide database to trigger reviews of 
risks at other facilities.
2. Enabling accountability by educating 
board members about safety and quality 
improvement.
3. Engaging staff in internal competition to 
spur improvement.
4. Using simulation to define team roles 
around critical incidents.
5. Standardizing the medication administra-
tion process to help prevent adverse drug 
events.
6. Using bundles of evidence-based 
practices to reduce hospital-acquired 
infections.
Facility-level results include:
● An 80 percent reduction over six years in 
the rate of pneumonia among intensive care 
patients on mechanical ventilation.
● Increased use of evidence-based 
surgical infection prevention treatment, by 
9 percentage points over one year, raising 
performance of one hospital from the worst 
to the best in the system. 
● An almost threefold increase in safety-
event reporting through prompt investigation 
and action in response to calls to a patient 
safety hotline.
● Increased compliance with a standardized 
medication administration process, from 39 
percent to 100 percent.
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs17 (nationwide)
The nation’s largest publicly funded 
integrated health care system, serving 
5.8 million veterans in 1,400 care sites 
nationwide including 153 VA medical 
centers, 783 community-based outpatient 
clinics, 135 nursing homes, and numerous 
home-care programs. Facilities and services 
are organized into 21 regional networks. 
1. Establishing the National Center for 
Patient Safety to develop training programs 
and tools that engage staff in systems 
learning (i.e., analyzing causes of errors and 
identifying effective means of preventing 
them).
2. Disseminating a medical team training 
program that institutes checklist-guided 
briefing and debriefing methods in operating 
rooms and ICUs.
3. Pilot-testing a nursing crew resource 
management training program to enhance 
communication and teamwork in general 
patient care units.
4. Developing a “Daily Plan” to educate 
hospital patients about their care plan in 
order to promote safe and patient-centered 
care.
5. Sponsoring the Inpatient Evaluation 
Center and the Surgical Quality 
Improvement Program to develop risk-
adjusted facility-level measures of patient 
outcomes and resources for improvement.
● Following implementation of checklist-
guided surgical briefings and debriefings: 
50 percent greater reduction in surgical 
mortality at trained vs. untrained facilities, 
increased on-time surgery starts, and a 33 
percent decline in nursing turnover. 
● Errors averted on 21–35 percent of shifts 
during which patients on pilot units had been 
educated about their daily plan of care.
● 66 percent to 69 percent reduction over 
four years in average rates of device-
associated bloodstream infections and 
pneumonia in ICUs; reductions of 76 
percent and 28 percent over two years in 
average rates of antibiotic-resistant health 
care–associated infections in ICUs and in 
other acute-care units, respectively.
● Reductions of 20 percent in hospital 
mortality rates and 33 percent in 30-day 
mortality rates among ICU patients over 
eight years, and continued reduction in 30-
day postoperative mortality and morbidity 
rates, which have declined 59 percent and 
51 percent, respectively, over 18 years.
● A doubling over four years in root-cause 
analyses completed in a timely manner, and 
in analyses that identified effective actions 
for improvement.
Source: Authors’ analysis of case study findings (see notes for sources). ICU = intensive care unit.
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SELF-ASSESSED PROGRESS IN  
PATIENT SAFETY
To summarize the progress they have made in pursuing 
patient safety over the past decade, the study sites were 
asked to employ a self-assessment instrument modeled 
on Wachter’s patient safety report card (described ear-
lier).18 Using this tool, the sites compared their experi-
ence in the early part of the last decade (2000–2004) 
with their more recent experience (2005–2010). The 
first period comprises the five years that followed the 
release of the IOM report, which were covered in the 
previous Commonwealth Fund report on these organi-
zations and in Wachter’s 2004 report card. The more 
recent period roughly corresponds with Wachter’s 
assessment of progress between 2004 and 2009, for 
which he assigned grades to 10 patient-safety domains 
(Exhibit 2). 
For each period, the study sites rated their prog-
ress in each of the 10 domains using a five-point scale. 
A rating of “1” was defined to mean minimal or no 
achievement in a specific kind of safety-related work, 
while a rating of “5” represented the attainment of an 
advanced level in that dimension. A few policy-ori-
ented domains were translated into equivalent manage-
rial concepts; for example, the nation’s research capac-
ity is equated with an organization’s learning capacity, 
and national organizational interventions are equated 
with an organization’s participation in collaborative 
improvement interventions. The reporting systems 
dimension was divided into two subdimensions for 
internal and external reporting. Results are shown in 
Appendix B.
On average across all dimensions, the sites 
gave ratings of 3.05 to their earlier experience and 
4.30 to their recent experience, suggesting substantial 
advancement in their patient safety efforts. The highest 
rating on average in the early period (3.50) was for col-
laborative improvement activities, and likely reflects 
the results of the sites’ participation in the Institute 
for Healthcare Improvement’s (IHI) 100,000 Lives 
campaign from December 2004 to June 2006.19 In the 
recent period, the highest ratings on average (4.75) 
were given in two domains: making effective use of 
internal reporting systems to identify and act on safety 
threats,20 and engaging leaders in patient safety as a 
core organizational value. 
The lowest ratings on average in both periods 
were given to the workforce and training domain, 
underlining the opportunity for spreading practical and 
effective team training programs such as that devel-
oped by the VA. Other domains that received relatively 
lower ratings included external reporting, patient 
engagement, and payment incentives. Commitment to 
external reporting may require further proof that such 
effort is worthwhile for generating useful information 
for improvement. (A large organization like the VA 
may find that its internal safety event reporting is ade-
quate for generating robust analysis of safety events.) 
Sites that were introducing initiatives to increase 
patient engagement in care appeared to be driven by 
the dual purpose of making care both safer and more 
patient-centered. Effective use of payment incentives 
may depend to some degree on the willingness of pay-
ers to engage with providers in designing effective 
programs.
Looking across time periods and domains, the 
greatest increase in average ratings (1.75 points) was 
for health information technology, reflecting more 
widespread deployment of EHRs and the enhancement 
of existing EHR systems at several sites. Advancement 
in organizational learning likely reflects the maturation 
of efforts to systematically analyze and apply learn-
ing from safety events and efforts to inculcate a safety 
“mind-set” within frontline teams, along with practical 
improvement skills. Ratings for participation in col-
laborative activities increased the least, on average. 
This finding may reflect higher baseline ratings on that 
dimension, as well as the natural life cycle of harvest-
ing the learning from collaborations such as the IHI’s 
Five Million Lives Campaign as they came to a close 
toward the end of the decade.
To enable comparison of study site ratings to 
Wachter’s assessment, his grades were converted to 
a five-point scale (A=5 and F=1). In the early period, 
average study site ratings were higher than the cor-
responding national grades for two of five domains 
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that Wachter assessed in 2004: making effective use 
of internal reporting systems and establishing a “just 
culture” of accountability.21 In the recent period, the 
study sites rated their progress on patient safety more 
highly, on average, than the national grade for eight 
of 10 dimensions assessed in 2009. (The sites’ lower 
rating of workforce/training issues may reflect higher 
expectations for achievement in this regard.) Overall, 
the higher ratings given to study sites suggest that 
they have made more rapid progress than the nation 
as a whole. It is likely that some of the strategies they 
employ are not yet widely or fully disseminated across 
most health care organizations.
While the small number of study sites limits 
the ability to generalize the findings, this review offers 
insight into how organizational leaders think about 
the relative strengths and weaknesses of their progress 
in safety improvement. Because the self-assessment 
instrument was used to facilitate the gathering of 
information during interviews and site visits, it was 
not blinded. Hence, ratings may be subject to social 
acceptability bias. However, the leaders’ appraisals 
generally seemed consistent with the learning they 
shared during interviews, including adjustments made 
after the discovery that some early approaches did not 
work as well as had been hoped. Although organiza-
tional leaders tend to rate safety culture more highly 
than do frontline staff,22 survey results from two of the 
study sites indicate that their staff also perceive that the 
organizations have made some progress in developing 
a safety culture during the recent time period. 
THEMES AND INSIGHTS
The experience of the four study sites provides valu-
able lessons in how to sustain, intensify, and expand 
patient safety improvement efforts within large and 
complex organizations. Their efforts reflect a com-
mon view of patient safety as a practical science or 
method that can be taught and practiced at multiple 
levels, from managers to frontline staff (Exhibit 3). 
Implemention has typically required a staged approach 
that is attentive to readiness for change within units 
and facilities, often by sequentially introducing ele-
ments of the safety program to build skills and 
receptivity to change over time. The study sites have 
achieved success by developing adaptable, principle-
based change methods, for both frontline staff and 
managers, methods that can be disseminated across 
units, facilities, and functions (including post–acute 
care services) so that positive experiences create cred-
ibility and demand for uptake among peers. 
Johns Hopkins’ Comprehensive Unit Based 
Safety Program uses an improvement skill-building 
approach that has been adapted to many different care 
Exhibit 2. Assessment of National Progress in 10 Key Patient-Safety Domains
Safety category
2004 Grade
(1999–2004)
2009 Grade
(2004–2009)
Regulation/accreditation  A–  B+
Reporting systems C  B+
Health information technology  B–  C+
Malpractice system and accountability  D+  C+
Workforce and training issues B  B–
Research *  B–
Patient engagement and involvement *  C+
Provider organization leadership engagement * B
National and international organizational interventions *  A–
Payment system interventions *  C+
Overall grade for progress in patient safety  C+  B–
*Domain not ranked in 2004.  
Copyrighted and published by Project HOPE/Health Affairs as R. M. Wachter, “Patient Safety at Ten: Unmistakable Progress, Troubling Gaps,” Health Affairs, Jan. 2010 
29(1):165–73. The published article is archived and available online at www.healthaffairs.org.  
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settings and associated with improved safety culture 
throughout the hospital.23 The VA’s medical team train-
ing program has shown that improving communica-
tion and teamwork among surgical staff can improve 
patient outcomes.24 While these programs typically 
begin in high-risk areas such as operating rooms and 
ICUs, they are now being adapted and expanded to 
general acute-care floors and support units (where their 
effectiveness is still being proven). Sentara Healthcare 
has taken a more general approach to instilling safety 
habits in the everyday work of staff. Providing tools 
and resources, including protected time to engage in 
improvement activities and executive sponsorship of 
safety efforts, can be critical to uptake and success. 
Regardless of the particular approach taken, the qual-
ity of local unit and facility leadership ultimately will 
determine the success of these initiatives.
The sites also have learned that engaging physi-
cians is critical to success. Sentara Healthcare initially 
focused its safety efforts on nursing staff, but found 
that physicians needed the same kind of training and 
reinforcement to ensure that they would all work 
toward a common goal. Likewise, the VA found that 
team training on nursing floors was facilitated by its 
prior implementation in surgical suites, which exposed 
physicians to common principles and provided impe-
tus for collaboration. Both sites found that engaging 
physicians proves more successful when framed as a 
way for them to gain control over their working envi-
ronment and time, e.g., by enabling on-time surgery 
starts and avoiding downtime caused by mistakes or 
faulty equipment. OSF Healthcare found that provid-
ing immediate, meaningful feedback was effective 
in motivating clinicians and managers when it was 
supplemented by education on how to use data for 
improvement and reinforced by some type of team-
based recognition of success.
Like frontline staff, leaders require both practi-
cal principles and corresponding tools to translate the 
aspiration to safety into meaningful actions that they 
can take every day to reinforce patient safety goals 
(Exhibit 4). These organizations emphasized the value 
of rigorous performance measurement whenever 
feasible, supplemented by opportunistic observation 
to assess the organization’s current mind-set toward 
safety. They used a combination of both hard and soft 
communication techniques, including performance 
feedback and thoughtful use of queries and anecdotes, 
to convey the importance of safety to staff.
All of these sites were integrated delivery sys-
tems that may have greater resources to execute change 
than do many other health care organizations. The 
VA in particular emphasized that integrated delivery 
allows its managers to take a holistic and long-term 
view of performance and to realize the “business 
case” for safety, as savings accrue back to the orga-
nization to support improvements. This alignment of 
incentives may become more common as the nation 
moves toward a more rational payment system and the 
creation of accountable care organizations and simi-
lar care models that allow providers to share in the 
rewards of more efficient, higher-quality care. In the 
meantime, institutions may be able to reap the benefits 
Exhibit 3. Principles of Safety at  
Johns Hopkins Medicine
Every system is perfectly designed to achieve the 
results it gets
To ensure safe design: standardize, create 
checklists, and learn when things go wrong
Recognize that safety principles apply to teamwork 
as well as to technical procedures 
Teams make wise decisions when there is diverse 
and independent input
Exhibit 4. Sentara Leadership Method for 
Performance Excellence
1. Daily check-in/huddle: to share and maintain 
situational awareness
2. Safety rounds: to identify problems and reinforce 
safety as a priority 
3. Action plans: to manage and ensure 
accountability for improvement work
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of collective action through participation in learning 
collaboratives and virtual networks.25
Leaders at these organizations have actively 
educated and/or engaged with members of their 
boards of trustees so that the board will understand 
safety principles and effectively hold the organization 
accountable by setting goals and monitoring results. 
Safety efforts have been driven in some cases by 
well-publicized safety lapses that acted as “moments 
of truth” to convince leaders that safety is critical to 
institutional reputation and success. Leaders appear 
to be driven by a keen sense of mission and commit-
ment to patient welfare that is shared by their nonprofit 
boards (or, in the case of VA facilities, by regional and 
national leaders who exercise oversight as part of the 
agency’s accountability to the President and Congress). 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
These case studies add to a growing body of literature 
describing how health care organizations undertake 
transformation initiatives in general and patient safety 
improvement in particular.26 Evidence from this and 
other research suggests that improving safety culture 
may have collateral benefit in facilitating broader 
delivery system transformation goals, such as reduc-
ing hospital readmissions.27 The experience of these 
organizational leaders illustrates that the patient safety 
journey is challenging but worthwhile, even in an 
imperfect external environment that does not fully sup-
port system transformation. 
Keeping the commitment to patient safety has 
required a sustained focus on making safety a core 
organizational value, a willingness to innovate and to 
apply learning about what works, and, perhaps above 
all, perseverance in staying the course. Wider uptake 
of patient safety initiatives will require similar orga-
nizational commitment, driven by local institutional 
mission and governance and reinforced through board 
oversight and public accountability mechanisms. 
Policy actions to support patient safety improvement 
include the development of rigorous and comprehen-
sive performance metrics and benchmarking data, 
refinement of supportive accreditation standards, 
research on effective improvement strategies, and pay-
ment system reforms that support providers in doing 
the right thing for patients.
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Appendix A. Select Study Site Results on Reducing Health Care–Associated Infections
Rates of Central Line–Associated Bloodstream Infections in
 Surgical Intensive Care Units at John Hopkins Hospital
Rate per 1,000 central line days
ICU = intensive care unit; SICU = surgical ICU, CSICU = coronary surgery ICU; WICU = Weinberg ICU.
Source: Johns Hopkins Hospital Epidemiology and Infection Control Department. 
SICU 6.49 2.39 0.61 0.93 0 1.18 1.52    0 1.07       0
CSICU 8.42 6.17 2.72 1.74 2.9 3.02 3.32 0.36 0.91  1.31
WICU 3.46 0.85 1.64 0.77 0.81 2.23 0.9 0.58 0.58  0.88
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Rate of Ventilator Associated Pneumonia (VAP): 
OSF Saint Francis Medical Center (Peoria, Ill.)
 Source: OSF HealthCare.
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Rate per 1,000 ventilator days
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5
14 the coMMonwealth FunD
Rate of Central Line–Associated Bloodstream Infections (CLABSI) 
Acquired by Patients in Sentara Intensive Care Units, 2002–2009
Source: Sentara Healthcare.
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APPENDIX B. SUMMARY OF PATIENT SAFETY SELF-ASSESSMENTS BY CASE STUDY SITES (N=4)
2000– 
2004
2005– 
2010* Change
5 = safety efforts meet relevant regulatory & accreditation requirements in 
a way that elevates the safety agenda (i.e., to “do the right thing”)                                                                                                                                                                                                      
3.25 4.50 1.25 1 = safety efforts meet relevant regulatory & accreditation requirements 
but generally stop at satisfying “the letter of the law”
5 = effective use of internal medical error and/or adverse event reporting 
or tracking system(s) to identify safety threats & actions to mitigate harm
3.25 4.75 1.50 1 = no internal reporting system, or lack of effective use
5 = active participation in external medical error and/or adverse event 
reporting system(s) to enable benchmarking and improvement (e.g., CDC, 
Leapfrog, regional or consortium databases)
2.75 4.00 1.25 1 = no voluntary participation in external reporting systems
5 = systemwide implementation of interoperable EHR with advanced 
CPOE and clinical decision support capabilities
2.75 4.50 1.75 1 = no current implementation of EHR or CPOE
Accountability 5 = institutionalization of a “just culture” that strikes a balance between “no 
blame” for human error and accountability for “blameworthy” acts, with 
standards applied fairly to all staff (i.e., both doctors and nurses) 
3.25 4.25 1.00 1 = no meaningful effort to instill a “just culture” 
5 = use of robust teamwork training, simulation, and other techniques to 
inculcate safety practices and behavior within the workforce  
2.50 3.75 1.25 1 = none of the above
5 = the organization learns from its errors and from others’ experiences 
and is able to disseminate lessons throughout the organization to mitigate 
risk and prevent harm  
3.00 4.50 1.50 1 = little or no focus on systemic learning from errors
5 = widespread adherence to policy for disclosure of medical errors to 
patients & families; robust programs to involve patients & families through 
education, advisory councils, feedback, etc.
3.00 4.00 1.00 1 = no meaningful patient engagement in safety
5 = strong & consistent board & C-suite focus on patient safety as core 
organizational value (manifested in board oversight, use of executive walk-
rounds, inclusion of safety in core performance metrics, etc.)
3.25 4.75 1.50 1 = patient safety not explicitly recognized or addressed as core value or 
tends to get pushed to the “back burner” by competing priorities
5 = active participation in collaborations or campaigns to improve patient 
safety, e.g., IHI campaigns, hospital associations, etc.
3.50 4.25 0.75 1 = no such participation
5 = payment reform or performance incentive programs are used as 
positive/productive levers/opportunities to improve patient safety 
3.00 4.00 1.00 1 = such efforts/programs tend to focus on “teaching to the test”
AVERAGE 3.05 4.30 1.25
*Most sites completed the self-assessment in the first half of 2010; one site did so in early 2011.
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